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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
COMBINED METALS REDUC-
TION COMPANY, a corporation, 
and 
BUD T. STEVENSON AND JOHN 
E. ALVERSON, co-partners do-
ing business under the firm name 
and style of Stevenson & Alver-
son, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
CASE 
NO. 6315 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Combined Metals 
Reduction Company, a corporation, and Bud T. Steven-
son and John E. Alverson, co-partners doing business 
under the firm name and style of Stevenson & Alverson, 
to review a decision of the Industrial Commission hold-
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2 
ing services performed by Stevenson and Alverson, lessee 
miners of the company, to be services performed "in 
employment" with the meaning of Section 19(j), Chapter 
43, Laws of Utah, 1937, and Chapter 52, Laws of Utah, 
1939. The Combined Metals Reduction Company, is a 
corporation, (an "employer" under the Utah Unemploy-
ment Compensation Law (Tr. 3)), engaged in mining 
operations in certain mining properties, including those 
known as the Queen Tunnel and the Butterfield Tunnel. 
On June 9, 1938, Bud T. Stevenson and John E. Al-
verson, hereinafter designated as "lessees" entered into 
a lease agreement with the Combined Metals Reduction 
Company, a Utah corporation. (Company's Exhibit 1.) 
The Combined Metals Reduction Company will 
hereinafter be designated as the "Company." 
The Industrial Commission of Utah will hereinafter 
be designated as the "Commission." 
The transcript of the hearing in this case will here-
inafter be designated as "Tr." 
_On the second day of October, 1940, a decision "\\ras 
~endered by a representative of the Departm_ent of Place-
ment and Unemployment Insurance holding that the serv-
ices performed by the "lessees" constituted services per-
formed "in employment" within the provision of the Utah 
Unemploym,ent Compensation Law and that they, Steven-
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son and Alverson, ''Tere not "employers" subject to con-
tribution liability within the provision of that Law. 
On the third day of October, 1940, a representative 
of the Department of Placement and Unemployment In-
surance rendered a decision of similiar effect finding that 
the Combined Metals Reduction Company was the "em-
ployer" and the "lessees" and, any individuals hired by 
them, ,,~ere "in employment" while performing services 
in accordance with the lease agreement herein referred 
to. The Company was required to file necessary reports 
on this employment with the Commission. The Company 
and the "lessees," by their attorney, disagreed with these 
decisions, and on the eighth day of October, 1940, filed 
appeals. The causes were joined by stipulation. 
On the tenth day of October, 1940, a hearing was 
held before the Appeal Tribunal, and on the fifteenth 
day of October, 1940, the Appeal Tribunal rendered a 
decision finding that: 
"1. Under the facts presented in this case Steven-
son and Alverson were 'in employment' with the 
Combined Metals Reduction Company during the 
period of time in question within the meaning of 
Section 19(j) (l) of the Utah Unemployment Com-
pensation Law. 
"2. Stevenson and Alverson performed a personal 
service for the Combined ~fetals Reduction Com-
pany for wages within the meaning of Section 
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4 
19(j) (5) of the Utah Unemployment Compensation 
Law. 
"3. -Such services performed by Stevenson and 
Alverson for the Combined Metals Reduction Com-
pany were not free from control or direction by 
the Company under the contract of service within 
the meaning of Section 19(j) (5) (a) of the Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Law. 
"4. The services performed by Stevenson and Al-
verson were performed within the usual course 
of the Company's business and were performed 
within the place of business of the Combined 
Metals Reduction Company within the meaning 
of Section 19(j) (5) (b) of the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Law. 
"5. Stevenson and Alverson were not customarily 
engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, profession, or business, within the 
meaning of Section 19(j) (5) (c) of the Utah Un-
employment Compensation Law." 
On the eighteenth day of October, 1940, the Com-
bined Metals Reduction Company and Bud T. Stevenson 
and John E. Alverson appealed from this decision to the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 
On the twenty~eighth day of October, 1940, the In-
dustrial Commission of Utah denied the appeal and af-
firmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal. 
The matter now comes before this Court on a Peti-
tion for Writ of Review. 
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In their brief (pp. 4-5), the petitioners outline several 
propositions: 
"(a) That the conclusion reached that Stevenson 
and .L~lverson are not employers but are perform-
ing services in employment for Combined Metals 
Reduction Company is not supported by the facts 
and is contrary to law. 
"(b) A judicial question is involved, the determ-
ination of which is outside and beyond the juris-
diction of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
"(c) That Sec. 19(j) Utah Unemployment Com-
pensation Law (Ch 1 Special Session 1936, Amd 
Ch 43, 1937 and Ch 52, 1939) is invalid under Sec. 
23, Art. VI, Constitution of Utah, as to title of 
amendatory acts. 
"(d) Also that said Utah Unemployment Com-
pensation Law is violative of Federal and State 
Constitutions, as unreasonably depriving parties 
of the right to contract." 
They state that all of these propositions will be relied 
upon by the lessor and only (a) and (d) by the "lessees." 
The Commission takes the position, however, that 
its decision is correct and con tends: 
1. That the "lessees" were "in employment" with-
in the meaning of Section 19 (j) of the Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Law. 
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2. The Commission properly exercised jurisdic-
tion over the matters invloved. 
3. That Section 19(j) of the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Law (Chapter 1, Special Ses-
sion, 1936, amended by Chapter 43, Laws of 
Utah, 193?, and Chapter 52, Laws of Utah, 
1939) is valid under Sec. 23, Art. VI, Constitu-
tion of Utah, as to title of amendatory acts. 
4. That the ·utah Unemployment Compensation 
Law does not violate the State and Federal 
Constitutions by depriving the parties of their 
right to contract. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE "LESSEES" WERE "IN EMPLOYMENT" WITH-
IN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH UNEMPLOY-
MENT COMPENSATION LAW. 
A. The legislative history, language, and plan of 
of the statute clearly contemplate coverage 
under the Law broader in scope than the 
traditional common law relationship of master 
and servant. 
The Unemployment Compensation Law as originally 
enacted by the legislature in 1936 (Laws of Utah, Special 
Session, 1936, Chapter 1) defined "employment" in Sec-
tion 19(g) thereof in the following terms: 
"Employment means service; including service in 
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any contract of hire, written or oral, express or 
implied, which service (1) is performed in this 
state by an individual, exclusive, however, of any 
service within this state which is incidental to 
the individual's service performed elsewhere; or 
(2) is performed elsewhere but is incidental to an 
individual's service in this state; ... " 
Under this definition it might have been argued that 
~overage under the Law was not defined in precise terms, 
and it might have been urged that it alluded to the tra-
ditional common law master and servant .relationship. 
See Texas Company v. Wheeless, (Miss. 1939), 18?' So. 880. 
In 193?', the Legislature of this State felt impelled 
to change this definition and to ascribe to the term "em-
ployment" a more precise meaning and to give to it a 
scope wide enough to cover thereunder persons other than 
those who are servants under common law concepts. 
In Section 19(j) (1), Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 193?', 
"employment" is redefined as follows: 
" service, including service in interstate 
commerce, performed for wages or under any 
contract of hire, written or oral, express or im-
plied." 
It added the provision that, regardless of whether the 
relationship between an individual and the unit for which 
services were performed was that of master and servant 
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8 
or principal and independent contractor, all services 
performed for wages shall constitute "employment" unless 
the circumstances under which the services were per .. 
formed met three named conditions for exclusion. The 
provision thus added reads (Section 19(j) (5)): 
"Services performed by an individual for wages 
shall be deemed to be employment subject to this 
act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction 
of the commission that-
"(a) such individual has been and will continue 
to be free from control or direction over the per-
formance of such services, both under his con-
tract of service and in fact; and 
"(b) such service is either outside. the usual course 
of the business for which such service is per-
formed or that such service is performed outside 
of all the places of business of the enterprise for 
which such service is performed; and 
" (c) such individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, pro-
fession or business." 
This change in the definition of "employment" ob-
viously flowed from a change in intent. A comparison 
of the definition as written by the Legislature shows 
that it ·adopted standards which were wholly unlike 
those used to determine employment under traditional 
common law and master and servant concepts for the 
purpose of determining coverage under the Utah Unem-
ployment Compensation Law; in other words, the statute 
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specifies only three criteria to be considered, and a de-
termination that a relationship does not conform to any 
single one of these is sufficient to create statutory "em-
ployment." 
The courts have so generally recognized that the 
statutory criteria in the various unemployment compensa-
tion la'\TS should be followed without reference to any 
previous common law concepts that the rule has now 
become definitely established. See Globe Grain & Milling 
Company v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, 98 Utah 
36, 91 P. (2d) 512; Creameries of America, Inc. v. The 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 98 Utah 571, 102 P. (2d) 
300: Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company v. The In-
dustrail Commission of Utah, (__ __________ Utah .......... ..), 102 P. 
{2d) 30'7; National Tunnel and Mines Company v. The 
Industrial Commission of Utah, C. .... ______ Utah ........... .), 102 P. 
{2d) 508; Unemployment Compensation Commission of 
lVorth Carolina v. jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 
215 N. C. 4'79, 2 S .. E. (2d) 584; Industrial Commission of 
Colorado v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 
103 Colo. 550, 88 P (2d) 560; Equitable Life Ins. Co. of 
Iowa v. Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado, 
(Colo. October 16, 1939), 95 P. (2d) 4; McDermott v. State 
of Washington, 196 Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 568; Georgia 
Bureau of Unemployment Compensation v. Young, 10 S. 
E. (2d) 412. 
B. The relationship between the "lessees" and the 
Company constituted "emplyoment" as defined 
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1n Section 19(j) (5) of the Law. 
The three statutory criteria in Section 19 (j) (5) are 
1n the conjunctive. A showing of conformity with all 
three is a prerequisite to an exemption of coverage under 
the Law. 
1. The Industrial Commission reasonably held that 
the Combined Metals Reduction Company failed to sat-
isfy the tests for exclusion as set out in Subsection (a) 
of that Section which required a showing that: 
"Such individual has been and will continue to 
be free from control or direction over the per-
formance of such services, both under his contract 
of service and in fact . . . '.' (Italics ours.) 
To conform with this condition, the party claiming ex-
emption from the Law must show not only that under the 
contract of employment the principal has not exercised 
and does not have the right to exercise control over the 
I 
performance of service, but that the person performing 
the service is free from control or the possibility of con-
trol in the future both under the contract and in fact. 
The statutory test above cited is considerably dif-
ferent from the test employed at common law to determine 
the existence of the master and servant relationship in 
that there is absent therefrom the factor of control over 
the details of the services performed which is commonly 
referred to in the Restatement of the Law of Agency. 
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Subsection (a) of the statutory test contains a positive 
requirement that the individual performing services be 
free from control over his performance if exemption is to 
be granted. Under the statute, it is unnecessary to determ-
ine what is a detail and what is "satisfaction with a re-
sult." The statutory relationship exists if the employer 
has a general control over the service performed. Such 
general control for the purposes of the statutory standard 
is present when the manner and means of performance 
are either predetermined by contract, necessarily resulting 
from the circumstances under which the serivces are per-
formed, or flow from the economic relationship which the 
persons performing the services bear to the enterprise for 
which they are performed. 
In recognition of this difference between the statu-
tory test provided in Section 19(j) (5) (a) and the common 
law test relating to control, the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado in Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado v. 
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550, 
88 P. (2d) 560, with respect to a statutory definition of 
employment identical with that contained in the Utah 
statute stated: 
"The first condition in the statutory test relates 
to freedom of control and direction over the per-
formance of services, both under contract and in 
fact. The test of freedom is either under contract 
or fact. Does the company control and direct the 
performance of services, or will it have the right 
to do so under the contract, if it desires to do so? 
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We are not here concerned with details but with 
general control. The possibility of control in the 
future is as important as an actual control at the 
present. 
'•In discussing the evidence we shall be controlled 
primarily by the undisputed facts, such as the 
contracts and the 'Rules and Instructions' govern-
ing the persons involved herein in their relations 
with the company. The question of control and 
direction, as set forth in section 19 (g) (5), is not 
a matter of degree. Undoubtedly, it relates to gen-
eral control. It is not satisfied by some 'detail' in 
which the individual may be free to exercise his 
own judgment. The power to terminate a contract 
for personal service at any time without liability 
is an important factor in arriving at a conclusion 
as to whether the individual is free of .control and 
direction, 'because the right immediately to dis-
charge involves the right of control.' Industrial 
Com. v~ Bonfils, '78 Colo. 306, 308, 241 Pac. ?35.'. 
(Italics supplied.) 
The view expressed by the Colorado court with 
~espect to the significant differences between the common 
law test of control and the statutory test was adpoted by 
a Wisconsin court. See Wisconsin Bridge & Iron (yo. v. 
Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, et al., 290 N. W. 199, 
233 Wis. 46?. In the course of interpreting statutory 
language identical with Section 19(j) (5) (a) the Wiscon-
sin court said: 
"For purposes of the present decision, we need 
not go into all the points wherein the present leg-
islative definition . of employment departs from 
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prior accepted standards. For instance, it has been 
regarded-and must still be so viewed under the 
workmen's compensation law-that lack of right 
to control is what precludes, in essence, the em-
ployment status. But by the first test of exclusion 
prescribed in 108.02(5) (a), it must be established 
that there is freedom from control not only (1) un-
der the contract but also (2) in fact. Furthermore 
there must be established not only freedom from 
control in the past but that the individual 'will 
continue to be free from the employer's control 
or direction . . . '" (Italics supplied.) 
If, therefore, the power of control exists under the con-
tract~ or in fact, proof of the extent of its actual exercise 
or even proof of its non-exercise is wholly immaterial. 
The statute looks to control which may be exercised in the 
future and it is sufficient under the statute to constitute 
employment if the employer has the power, if he chooses 
to exercise it, over the performance of service at any 
time during the continuance of the relationship. See also 
Creameries of America, Inc. v. The Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah, supra; Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Com-
pany v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, supra; Equit-
able Life Insurance Co. of Iowa v. Industrial Commis-
sion of the State of Colo., supra. 
In the case of the National Tunnel and Mines Com-
pany, supra, Chief Justice Moffat said and we quote: 
'"·"'j 
I 
"Under the aforesetforth provisions of the leases, 
- there are definite provisions made for the control 
and direction over the performance of the service 
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both under the contract of hire and in fact. The 
only evidence that there is such a contractual 
relationship as a leasor-lessee relationship is found 
in the introductory provisions wherein it is stated 
the plaintiff does 'hereby grant, demise and let 
unto said Lessee that portion of the company's 
mining property situated . . .' It is specifically 
provided that the leasor reserves the property and 
the right of property in and to all ores extracted 
from said 'demised' premises. There is provided in 
the lease a general right of control and direction 
over the relationship created under the contract. 
The claimant meets the requirements for one elig-
ible for benefits. See Pottordorff v. Fidelity Coal 
Mining Co., 86 Kans. 774, 122 P. 120; Industrial 
Commission v. Bonfils, 78 Col. 306, 241 P. 735; 
McDermott v. State et al., 196 Wash. 261, 82 P. 
(2d) 568. A contrary result was reached, though 
the same principles of law were applied, because 
the element of control was lacking in the case of 
Texas Co. v. Wheeless, ............ Miss ............ , 18'7 So. 880." 
As in the record of the National Tunnel and Mines 
Company case, the record in the instant case was that 
the "lessees" were not either under their contract with 
the company or, in fact, free from control of the pos-
sibility of such control in the future. 
The Industrial Commission was not unreasonable in 
holding that the Company had failed to meet the test 
as provided by Section 19(j) (5) (a). 
Under the terms o{ the so-called lease agreement 
(Company's Exhibit 1), the Company secured the per-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
formance of ,v-eil defined services by the claimant and 
did not, in a strict sense of the word, create a right or 
interest in the property to which the claimant was given 
a so-called property right.A review of both the contract 
and the transcript indicates that the most that can be 
said of the lease in the sense of creating a right or in-
terest in the property is that it assigns the miners to 
work in a particular portion of the mine, and that it 
specifies what otherwise would be implied that, namely, 
while performing services at the assigned place, at times 
and in the manner determined by the Company, the 
miner is not to be considered as a trespasser. Such is the 
net effect of the use of the real property terminology in 
the contract. Moreover, this terminology amounts to no 
more than a specification of an incident of every em-
ployment contract; each such contract impliedly permits 
the individual performing services to come and remain 
on the employer's premises in the course of performing 
services. Section 304 of Tiffany, Real Property, states this 
self-evident principle: 
"A contract of lodging also giving not an exclusive 
right to a part of the premises, but merely a right 
to enter thereon and use them for certain purposes 
is in the· nature of a license, and not a lease. Like-
wise, the permission generally tacit, given to an 
employee or other person having business with the 
owner of the land to enter on the land for the 
purpose of transacting such business creates the 
relationship of licensor and licensee." 
The specification in the employment contract of 
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this tacit immunity of the employee with respect to his 
employer's property does not change the relationship nor 
affect the application of the statutory definition of em-
ployment. Of course, it is not contended that all bona 
fide leases of mining property create the statutory em-
ployment relationship; nevertheless, it should he apparent 
that the mere use of leasehold terminology should not he 
permitted to obscure the employment relationship. See 
National Tunnel and Mines Company v. The Industrial 
Commission of Utah, supra; Creameries of America, Inc. 
v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, supra; Salt Lake 
Tribune Publishing Company v. The Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, supra; McDermott v. Washington, supra; 
Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado v. North-
western Mutual Life Insurance Company, supra. 
In an enterprise of any size the factory worker IS 
assigned to a particular department or machine, a waiter 
to particular tables, and a retail clerk to particular 
counters. The perference of the employee may be given 
considerable weight by the employer in making the assign-
ment, but in those cases and in the present case (Com-
pany's Exhibit 1), the employees cannot, without per-
mission, leave their assigned post nor enter the premises 
except during the hours of business and in accordance 
'vith the practices established by the employer. Under 
the lease, the "lessees" were in the same situation as em-
ployees generally. They acquired no exclusive right to pos-
session of any part of the mine. Anyone else whom the 
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employer permitted could enter on and use the premises 
and the lessees, like any employees, were required to ad-
just their activities to such use by others. See Company's 
Exhibit 1 (para. 6) : 
"RIGHT -0 F-WAY. 6. Lessee shall allow the 
Comu.any or agents of said Company to have at 
all times access to all parts of said premises for 
the purpose of inspecting, surveying, or sampling 
the same. Said lease is to be subject to a right-of-
way for the Company or its employees or its other 
leessees or their employees through all workings 
existing or that may be made within said prem .. 
. '' 1ses. 
The "lessees" not only acquired no title to the real 
estate but acquired no title to the minerals after they 
were extracted (Tr. 30-31), (Company's Exhibit 1, p. 8), 
and their presence in the mine was merely an incident to 
the general plan for operating the employer's enterprise. 
(Tr. 24). The terms of the lease sustain this conclusion. 
Under the lease the "lessees" were merely given the use 
of the premises in order that they might carry on the 
business of the Company. Indeed, the occupancy alone 
was of no value to the Company apart from the conduct 
of its business at the premises. The "lessees" were en-
titled to the "use" of the permises only for such purpose, 
and while there they were required to carry on activities 
in conformance with the Company's general operations. 
(Tr. 27, 28) 
"Q. You mentioned that there were ten or twelve 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
sets of lessees in the Queen Tunnel? 
"A. I believe I said eight or ten. 
"Q. What provision is made for coordinating the 
activities of those men so they won't interfere 
with each other on transporting material into 
the mine or out of the mine? 
"A. Well, that is more or less an arrangement 
between the individual lessees themselves to 
coordinate their operations and jointly with 
the Company. In other words, if several 
lessees happen to have a shipment ready all 
at the same time, they would have to arrange 
among themselves who would be shipped first 
or make some arrangement for their turn. 
There is no supervision by the Company of 
the lessees' activities. They handle their own 
affairs and have to make their own arrange .. 
ments as to their transporation and as to their 
turn to get transportation when they have 
shipments available. 
"Q. In the event lessees cannot agree, what 
occurs? 
"A. Well, in that case I guess there would be 
an argument and it would depend on the 
system how it would turn out." 
* * * * 
"Q. Does the Company maintain a superintend-
ent or mining boss who, I was going to say, 
well, use the work 'sup.ervise' operations in 
the Queen Tunnel? 
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"A. Let me ans''?er that in a little different way. 
The Company has a full mining organization 
at the property. This organization, provided 
by the Company to handle the entire prop-
erty, consists of superintendent, chief bosses, 
mine clerks, and the customary organization 
that is set up to handle mining property. But 
as far as lessees on Queen Tunnel are con-
cerned, the Company does not attempt to 
supervise their work." 
The collection of "rental" would have been Impos-
sible except with reference to the services performed by 
the "lessees." The Company was mainly interested, since 
its income was derived from the profits on ore shipments, 
in producing as much ore as possible. (Tr. 24) 
Under the authorities, it has been generally held 
that where the use of the premises is connected with, 
and incidental to tP.e operations of the business of the 
lessor and is calculated to enable a more convenient per-
formance of that business, the relationship of employer 
and employee exists even under the common law test of 
the existence of that relationship. See McQuade v. Em-
mons, 38 N. J. Law 397; Waller v. Morgan, 57 Ky. 136; 
State v. Curtis, 20 N. C. 363; Neal v. Bellamy, 73 N. C. 
384; Hayward v. Rogers, 73 N. C. 320; Tucker v. Park 
Yarn ~fill Co., 140 S. E. 744. See also, Bowman v. Bradley, 
151 Pa. 352, 24 A. 1062; Davis v. Long, 178 N. W. 936. 
It is clear that the "lessees" were not either under 
their contract or, in fact, free from control or from the 
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possibility of such control in the future. The Company 
required that the "lessees" enter upon the said premises 
within fourteen days from the date of the signing of the 
lease, and to do not less than forty shifts of work each 
ancl every month during the life of the lease and to work 
the same in a good and miner-like fashion and in a man-
ner necessary to good and economical mining. (Company's 
Exhibit 1.) 
The Hlessees" were required to post and keep posted, 
at the entry of all workings, notices to the effect that 
such mines were being worked by the said ''lessees." 
(Company's Exhibit 1). The "lessees" were required to 
regularly report to the Company the number of shifts 
worked each month and the names of the individuals 
performing the work during such shifts. 
The company retained the right to determine what 
individuals could be hired by Stevenson and Alverson. 
(Tr. 38) 
uQ. When you hired any individual to perform 
services on the lease, was it required that you 
secure the approval of the Company? 
"A. (Stevenson) Well, it was required in the lease, 
but never was done." 
The '"'lessees" were required (Company's Exhibit 1. 
"Work Requirements"): 
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•·. to personally supervise the work and assist 
in the performance thereof and not to employ or 
bring upon the premises any persons objectionable 
to the Company." (Italics ours.) 
On Page 13 (Plaintiffs' Brief) after referring to the 
Federal and State regulations and the penalties imposed 
for shipping '"hot ore" the plaintiffs said: 
" surely there can be no impropriety in 
requiring that lessees 'personally supervise the 
work and assist in performance thereof.'" 
While there is no "impropriety" in such a requirement, 
as is embodied in the lease agreement, the circumstance 
that the personal supervision performed on behalf of 
the Company is made necessary by reason of police regu-
lations does not mean that the services do not constitute 
"employment." An employee on a railroad would be none-
theless an employee by reason of the fact that the Fed-
eral and State governments, by regulation, require the 
railroad company to supervise the performance of his 
services. 
On Pages 16-19 of their brief, plaintiffs argue, if 
the "lessees" performed "personal services" they did so 
on their "own account" and not for the Company. In 
reply to this argument, we first point out to this Court 
that "employment" is defined in Section 19(j) (6) (p) of 
the Law as follows: 
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"(p) 'Wages' means all remuneration payable for 
personal services, including commissions and bo-
nuses and the cash value of all remuneration pay-
able in any medium other than cash . . " 
and not as quoted in plaintiff's brief at Page 1'7: 
"'Wages' are defined in the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Act as all conpensation payable for 
personal services rendered for another under a 
contract of hire, express or implied." 
They go on to say in plaintiff's brief at Page 1'7: 
"Any remuneration therefore, whatever its form, 
may constitute wages if it is received for personal 
services rendered for another." 
We respectfully call the attention of this Court to the 
fact that nowhere in the Law does the definition of 
"services" or "wages" contain the words "for another." 
The contention of the plaintiffs appears to be based 
on a misapprehension that if a direct advantage or bene-
fit inures to any one other than the alleged employer, 
the employment relation may not exist. 
We fail to find any basis for the argument either 
that the "lessees" were perforn1ing services solely for 
themselves and not for the Company or that the "lessees". 
are not "in employment" because the services were ren-
dered "for their own account." 
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In vie"~ of the specific service requirement as set 
out in the lease agreement under the title of "Work Re-
quirements:" (Company's Exhibit 1). 
"WORK REQUIREMENTS. 1. The Lessee agrees 
to enter upon said premises within 14 days from 
the date of the signing of this lease, and to do not 
less than 40 shifts of tvork each and every month 
during the life of this lease, and work the same in 
good and miner-like fashion and in a manner 
necessary to good and economical mining, and 
properly timber the same where necessary, so as 
to take out the greatest amount of ore possible 
with due regard to the safety, development and 
preservation of said premises; to personally super-
vise the work and assist in the performance thereof 
and not to employ or bring upon the premises 
any persons objectionable to the Company." 
(Italics ours.} 
the Company certainly cannot deny that the lease agree-
ment provided a definite performance of work and that 
such work constituted a service. 
Actually, the "lessees" did perform services under 
the above-mentioned contract, and they did receive re-
muneration from the Company itself by virtue of the 
circumstances under which the Company controlled the 
shipments of ore and the moneys received therefrom. 
The opinion of this Court in the case of The Fuller 
Brush Company v. The Industrial Com1nision of Utah, 
C. .......... Utah .......... J, 104 P. (2d) 201, as quoted by plaintiff's 
in their brief (pp.17 -18) said: 
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"That claimant performed personal service is not 
in dispute, but there is a dispute as to whether 
such services were performed for plaintiff or for 
self, and as to whether he received wages there-
fore or profits on sales. In other words, was the 
relationship between plaintiff and claimant that 
of employer and employee or that of vendor and 
vendee? The finding being positive and definite 
that claimant in the performance of the personal 
service was free of all direction and control -by 
plaintiff, both in fact and under his contract of 
hire, it must follow of necessity that he did not 
perform service for plaintiff under a contract 
of hire or for wages, and therefore the relationship 
was one that never came within the scope of the 
act because he was not in employment that would 
bring him within the act, to wit, rendering per-
sonal services for another under a contract of hire 
or for wages, " 
it cannot be applied to this case because the two are not 
I 
analogous. 
In The Fuller Brush Company case~ supra, the 
Court found: 
". . . that claimant in the performance of per-
sonal service was free of all direction and control 
by plaintiff both in fact and under his contract 
of hire . . ." 
and reasoned that since there was no control then it 
co11ld not be said that the plaintiff rendered personal 
services for another. 
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We again call this Court's attention to the fact that 
the words "for another" are not contained in the defini-
tion of H"~ages" embodied in the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation La"~. We "~ish to point out that the in-
stant case differs from the case of The Fuller Brush 
Company, supra, in that Stevenson and Alverson were 
performing services under the direction and control of 
the Company ''Tithin the provisions of the lease agree-
ment (Company's Exhibit 1), and that, therefore, the 
argument advanced in the former case cannot apply in 
the matter now before this Court. 
This Court in The Fuller Brush Company case, supra, 
in order to find an answer to the question of whether or 
not the relationship between the plaintiff and the claim-
ant is that of vendor and vendee, used a test which was 
similar, if not identical, with the test as set out in Sec-
tion 19(j) (5) (a) of the Law. 
Because the lease agreement In the instant case, 
which definitely retains such right to direct and control 
the "lessees," is to be considered by Section 19(j) (5) (a} 
or a similar test, then it would necessarily follow that 
the application of the test laid down in the case of The 
Fuller Brush Company, supra, must lead this Court to 
the conclusion· that the relationship between the parties 
was not that of lessor and lessee but that services per-
formed by Stevenson and Alverson were services per-
formed "in employment" within the meaning of Section 
19(j) of the Law. 
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The plaintiffs in their brief (p.19) state that: 
" the relationship between the parties was 
not that of employer and employee but that of 
lessor and lessee . . . " 
and, that: 
"There is no occasion to go further; no occasion 
to inquire as to whether, had the lessees been em-
ployees of the lessor, they would have come within 
the provisions of the Utah Unemployment Com-
pensation Law; to inquire as to the appilcability 
of Section 19 (j) (5) since ·as this Honorable Court 
has pointed out, (apparently refers to the case of 
The Fuller Brush Company) that section becomes 
material only after it has been determined that 
personal services were rendered for another for 
wages or under a contract of hire." (Italics ours.) 
The plaintiffs without applying any test, thought 
process, or reasoning whatsoever have reached the con-
clusion that here we have a relationship of lessor and 
lessee which exists for no other reason than that it 
arises under an agreement entitled "lease agreement." 
We contend that there can be no real determination 
of a relationship unless that determination is based on 
a line of thought pro.cesses which is governed by a par-
ticular set of tests, reasons, or rules. This Court in the 
case of The Fuller Brush Company case, supra, based its 
findings on a test of control. 
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'Ve submit that if the plaintiffs are relying on the 
rule laid do'\~n in The Fuller Brush Company case, supra, 
then the plaintiffs n1ust fail in their contention that the 
services performed by Stevenson and Alverson were not 
serYices performed "in employment." 
2. The Industrial Commission reasonably held that 
the Company failed to satisfy the test for exclusion a~ 
set out in Subsection (b) of Section 19(j) (5) of the Law 
which required a sho'"~ing that: 
"(b) such service is either outside the usual course 
of the business for which such service is performed 
or that such service is performed outside of all 
the places of business of the enterprise for w-hich 
such service is performed; and " 
We submit that the services performed by the 
"lessees" were services performed in the usual course of 
the Company's business which consisted of mining and 
milli~g lead~ zinc, gold, and silver ores. 
The "lease agreement" contains provisions designed 
to secure the performance of services in conformity 
with the usual operations of the Company. (Tr. 24, 28, 
30, 31, 35~ 38, 39) (Company's Exhibit 1.) 
As we have hereinbefore pointed out, there is no 
relationship created under the "lease agreement" which 
was in any way inconsistent with the employment rela-
tionship that "\\-ras_ also:'. created. In that agreement, the 
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Company reserved among other things, a right-of-way 
over the "lease" for not only the Company's employees 
and agents hut, also, for any or all of its other "lessees" 
or their members. (Company's Exhibit 1, para. 6.) 
It is immaterial that many of the controls set out 
in the "lease agreement" carried out a general theme that 
the work was to be performed in a "good and miner-like 
fashion." As a matter of fact, the provision that the 
work was to be performed in a "good and miner-like 
fashion" reserved to the Company the right to at all 
times control the actual performance of services so that 
they would conform with the usual methods of operation 
of the Company's business. 
The "lessees" were actually performing only a part 
of the business of mining; the other necessary functions 
such as tramming of waste and ore and the marketing of 
the same, were performed by the Company's employees. 
The rights of possession granted the "lessees" under the 
lease agreement were clearly those rights which were 
immediately incident to the performance of the prospect-
ing for and the mining of ore on the property of the 
Company. 
The Commission reasonably found that the Com· 
pany failed to make a showing that the services were 
not performed in the place of business of the Company 
and that, as a matter of fact, it is clear that the lease agree-
ment in this case was drawn to secure the performance 
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of services on the Company\; operated porperty and was 
not i~tended to convey any interest in the "lease block" 
,,,hich could in any ,,~ay be inconsistent with the usual 
course of the business of the Company in the place of 
business of the Company. (Tr. 2?) 
"T e think the transcript at page 24 makes this point 
clear: 
"Q. \\1hen you say that the Company has no 
Company operations in the Queen Tunnel, 
you do not intend to convey the impression 
that the Company has no interest in the op-
erations of that mine? 
"A. If I can make myself clear, our interest in the 
Queen Tunnel area is to have the lessees pro-
duce ore from which the Company derives 
by royalty payments by the lessee on the ore 
produced by the lessee, and it is to the Com-
P?ny's interest to have the lessees produce 
as much ore as possible because the proceeds 
of the lessees' operation are split on a royal-
ty method between the Company and the 
lessee~ and in order to facilitate the operation 
of the lessees the Company has provided 
some transportation facilities on the Queen 
Tunnel level in the form of a storage battery 
locomotive hauling, which I mentioned, and 
to that extent the Company does work in 
the Queen Tunnel area, but as far as mining 
ore is concerned on its own account through 
employees paid day's wages, the Company 
has no mining operations in that area." 
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3. The Commission reasonably concluded that the 
Company failed to show that the "lessees" were cus-
tomarily engaged in such an independently established 
trade, occupation, profession, or business as was con-
templated by Subsection (c) of Section 19(j} (5) of the 
Law. 
The plaintiffs in their brief (pp. 22-23) maintain 
that the "lessees" were "customarily" engaged in such 
tine of work, and that for a period of two and one-half 
years before the hearing of the Appeal Tribunal one of 
the "lessees" had been engaged in leasing. Plaintiffs fur-
ther state that because Stevenson and Alverson had been 
engaged on this lease since June, 1938, they were there-
fore exempt within the meaning of Subsection (c) of Sec-
tion 19(j) (5), and in connection therewith indicate that 
Stevenson and Alverson were operating as a so-called co-
partnership. 
The fact that Stevenson and Alverson engaged in 
work as "partners" need not be considered as a conclu-
sive indication of a business unit or enterprise. It has 
a more ready explanation in the usual custom followed 
by~ so-called lessees in the mining industry. In practically 
all leases there is a period in which the lessee or the 
lessees must perform "dead work," i. e., vvork concerned 
with the development of the leased premises in which no 
paying ore is obtained. Normally, too, the usual lessee 
is unable to pay n1iners wages to any individual per-
forming services on the lease with then1 ~ they therefore 
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arrange to secure such help by entering upon the lease 
" t " as par ners. 
The so-called partnership arrangement, therefore, 
is seen as n1erely a convenient "~ay of securing the per-
formance of services "~ithout an obligation to pay wages 
on the part of any one of the so-called lessees. 
The language of the Law provides that the individual 
be independently established in, as well as customarily 
engaged in, and, therefore, the burden is on the plain-
tiffs to show that the "lessees" were customarily estab-
lished in the business of producing and selling ore in-
dependently of any connection with the Company. Sub-
section (c) does not require that the "lessees" be engaged 
in another business, but it does require that the business 
in which they are engaged be established independently 
of their single connection with any one company. 
There can be no such independently established 
business if its origin and termination depend entirely 
upon a particular connection. It is significant that the 
statute requires that the business be "independently 
established" and not that the business be merely inde-
pendent. 
The nature of the establishment governs whether 
the individual is. subject to the type of risk which should 
be covered by unemployment compensation, and whether 
the individual performs services in a business so estab-
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lished that notwithstanding the fact that a particular 
connection is severed, he is still in a position to continue 
to operate on his own accout earning a livelihood from 
all who choose to use his services or buy his products. 
Thus to meet this "test" relating to the independent 
establishment of a business or trade an individual must 
be so set up in that business or trade that he is not 
dependent upon the continuance of his connection with 
a single company. He must have the power to perform 
the duties incident to his business or trade in accordance 
with his own methods; he must be free to buy his equip-
ment, tools, or merchandise in the competitive market; 
the good will of his business must be his own, trans-
ferable at his pleasure, and for a consideration satisfac-
tory to him; he must be able to select and determine for 
himself the desirability and efficiency of his own equip-
ment and employees; the continuation of his business 
must in no way be dependent upon the will of another, 
and he must be able to determine the extent to which 
services will be performed for others while his perform-
ance of services for any one company is in progress. 
It is clear from the record in this case that the 
"lessees" are not independently established. No inde-
pendently established business would appear to be so 
subservient to a single employer for the disposal of its 
products and for the determination of the length of 
time during which it shall operate. The mere fact that the 
"lessees" because of their shift (Company's Exhibit 1) 
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were required to be on the job personally each day, nega-
tives the possibility of the "lessees" holding themselves 
out as being able to undertake the operation of mines 
generally. 
The Colorado Supreme Court in the case of Indus-
trial Commission of the State of Colorado v. Northwestern 
Nlutual Life Insurance Company, supra, said: 
"The third test as to exemption from coverage 
is that the 'individual' is customarily engaged 
independently in an established trade, occupation, 
profession or business. This would necessitate a 
showing by the company to the satisfaction of the 
Commission that its agents are established in the 
business of selling insurance, independent of what-
ever connection they may have with the company." 
(Italics ours.) 
See also Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission of Wisconsin, supra; Pond v. Michigan Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission, et al., (Michigan Circuit 
Ct.: 1939); Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa v. In-
dustrial Commission of the State of Colorado, supra. 
The foregoing presents no novel interpretation of 
the lease. In cases where the power and right of control 
vested in a lessor were less clear than in this case and 
under statutes providing for less extensive coverage than 
that provided under the Unemployment Compensation 
Law, "leases" 'vere held to create the employment rela-
tionship. Martin v. Republic Steel Co., (Ala. 1933), 146 
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So. 276; Pottorff v. Fidelity Coal Mines Co., 86 Kan. 774, 
122 P. 120. In the Pottorff case, the court said (at p. 122): 
"Without further citation from the multitude of 
authorities on this subject, it only remains to apply 
these principles to the contract in question. First 
as to time: The contractor may have the benefit 
of the agreement for five years or five days, or 
any shorter period at the will of the company. He 
must quit should 'the working of the mines not 
he agreeable' to the company, with no further 
right than to load the product mined in 60 days. 
But this provision so destructive of independence 
is not limited in its effect to time merely, for the 
right to thus summarily annul the agreement 
necessarily carries with it the potency of compell-
ing such means and methods as will make the con-
duct of the work agreeable to the company. While 
the contract does not state that Barrett shall ob-
serve the methods and use the means prescribed 
by the company or suffer forfeiture, yet the com-
pany may annul the contract at its option if a 
failure to observe its directions in these matters 
should not be agreeable. The use of the word 
'agreeable' seems naturally to apply to such con-
duct of the work as might cause danger or bring 
disaster to the miners or the property. But whether 
such a contingency was in mind or not, the sweep-
ing reservation includes certainly the right to in-
terpose whenever negligent methods 'vill imperil 
life or porperty, and under the clause in question 
the company might have compelled the contractor 
to exercise proper care in the use of electrical ap-
plicances or to have ceased their use altogether by 
terminating the contract. In the Nelson case it was 
said that, if the Cement Company had retained 
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the right to discharge at will one of the contractors, 
they ,,~ere not independent. Here the right of 
annulment, equivalent to a discharge, is expressly 
reserved in the contract. 
"The contractor does not appear to be independent 
in other respects. The output of the mine is ab-
solutely controlled by the company. It may oper-
ate the mines at full capacity or shut down en-
tirely according to its own 'requirements and de-
mands.' . . . 
"It is true that the effect of a contract is not to 
be determined by the phraseology of detached 
parts, but the entire instrument as a connected 
whole, and each part as affected by every other 
part, yet in view of the provisions referred to and 
the spirit and purpose of the agreement as we 
interpret it in the light of the business to be op-
erated under it, it is held that Barrett is not an 
independent contractor, and that the contract 
referred to is not a defense to this action." 
In the Martin case, the court said at (p. 278): 
"If, however, the right to supervise, direct and 
control the employee is, under our statute, determ-
inative, in any way, of whether the contract 
creates the relation of employer and employee, the 
contract in this case cannot but impress the ju-
dicial mind that the reserved right of the defend-
ant to terminate the contract, and thereby the 
right to discharge the employee, when, and in 
the event "it appears to said engineer or superin-
tendent that said second party or any of his em-
ployees or associates has been guilty of violating 
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'incapacity,' is of considered weight as tending to 
show that the employee is not an independent 
contractor. Bristol & G. Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion et al., 292 Ill. 16, 126 N. E. 599; Messmer 
case, note 19 Ann. Cas. page 18; Bernauer v. Hart-
man Steel Co., 33 Ill. App. 491; Adams Express 
Co. v. Schofield, 111 Ky. 832, 64 S. W. 903; Shea 
v. Reems, 36 La. Ann. 966; Keyes v. Second Bap-
tist Church, 99 Me. 308, 59 A. 446; Brackett v. 
Lubke, 4 Allen (Mass.) 138, 81 Am. Dec. 694; 
Morgan v. Bowman, 22 Mo. 538; Burke v. City, 
etc., Contract Co., 133 App. Div. 113, 117 N. Y. S. 
400; Dickson v. Hollister, 123 Pa. 421, 16 A. 484, 
10 Am. St. Rep. 533; Johnston v. Hostie, 30 U.C.Q.B. 
232. 
"It cannot be said that the right to terminate a 
contract, if it appears to the engineer or super-
intendent of the owner that the person perform-
ing the service has viola ted the rules of the em-
ployer, or has been 'guilty of carelessness or in-
capacity,' does not arm the owner (employer) with 
a most potent weapon to enforce the due and 
proper execution of the work according to the 
contract between the parties. This reserved right 
to terminate the contract in the events enumerated, 
to our mind, negatives the. idea that the petitioner 
was an independent contractor. rfhe true criterion 
is not whether the owner did in fact exercise super .. 
vision, but rather did he have the right to do so; 
did he possess the power to control? Honnold on 
Workmen's Compensation, "'Vol. 1~ Page 1.67: State 
ex rei. V a. & R. Lake Co. v. District Court, 128 
Minn. 43, 150 N. W. 211." 
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Under Sections 14 and 15 of the "lease agreement" 
between the Company and Stevenson and Alverson, the 
po"-er to terminate is effectively established as in the 
above quoted case. It should not be overlooked that a 
primary condition for the existence of the status of an 
"independent contractor" unless the contract for services 
provides a fixed and definite result upon the completion 
of "-hich such person is entitled to the contract price. 
See Ludlotv v. Industrial Co1nmission of Utah, 65 Utah 
182; 235 P. 84. No such predetermined result existed in 
this case. The power of the Company to enforce its will 
on matters affecting the manner and means of the per-
formance of services by the "lessees" negatives the ex-
istence of a "result." 
In Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Bonfils, 
78 Colo. 306, 241 P. '735, a workman's compensation case, 
the question before the court was whether or not a de-
ceased coal hauler was an employee under section 9 of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads as fol-
lows: "The term 'employee' shall mean and include: ... 
Every person in the service of any other person . . . 
under any contract of hire, express or implied ... " The 
court said (p. '736): 
"A servant is one whose employer has the order 
and control of work done by him, and who directs 
or may direct the means as well as the end. Arnold 
v. Lawrence~ 72 Colo. 328, 530, 213 P. 129. By vir-
tue of its potver to discharge, the company could, 
at any moment, direct the minutest detail and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
method of the work. The fact, if a fact, that it 
did not do so is immaterial. It is the power of con-
trol, not the fact of control, that is the principle 
factor in distinguishing a servant from a contractor. 
Franklin Coal & Coke Co. v. Ind. Co., 296 Ill. 329, 
f29 N. E. 811. The most important point 'in de-
termining the main question (contractor or em-
ployee) is the right of either to terminate the re-
lation without liability.' Ind. Com. v. Hammond, 
?? Colo. 414, 236 P. 1006. This is a confirmation by 
this court of the rule above stated as to control, 
because the right immediately to discharge In-
volves the right of control." (Italics ours.) 
C. The lease relationship is not an exclusive one. 
Apparently, the plaintiffs in their brief (pp. 9-12) 
argue that when a lease agreement is entered into he-
tween two parties it necessarily creates the relationship 
of landlord and tenant and excludes all other relation-
ships. We submit that a true lease does not exist in this 
case any more than it did in McDern!ott v. State of Wash-
ington, supra; Georgia Bureau of Unemployment Com-
'pensation v. Young, 10 S. E. (2d) 412; Wyoming U nemploy-
ment Compensation Commission v. Tharp; National 
Tunnel & Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah! 
supra; Bert Baker, Inc. v. Michigan Unemployment Com-
pensation Commission, (Mich. Cir. Court for Ingham 
County, July 15, 1940, C. C. H. Mich. para. 8070) for the 
reasons expressed in the opinions in those cases. 
The facts that warrant the conclusion that a lease 
was entered into also justify the conclusion that coexist-
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ent ~.,.ith the lease there was an ~mployment relationship. 
In Hughes v. Cheatham, 5 M. & G. 54, 78, 44 E. C. L. 39, 
134 Reprint 479 (quoted in Kerrains v. People, 60 N. Y. 
221, 226 and Ofschlager v. Surbeck, 22 Misc. 595, 598, 50 
N. Y. S. 862) it was said: 
"There is no inconsistency in the relation of master 
and servant with that of landlord and tenant." 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the employ-
ment relationship referred to in the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Law is not necessarily that of master and 
servant at common law but takes in factual situations 
beyond the scope of that relationship. It is clear that 
a leasehold may coexist with the employment relation-
ship with the result that a Company which considers 
itself a lessor will be responsible for the payment of 
contributions. 
D. A conclusion by a State court that the em-
ployment relationship exists within the mean-
ing of the State unemployment compensation 
law can have no effect upon the Company's 
status under the various Federal laws. 
The plaintiffs argue in their brief (pp. 5-8) that a 
holding by this Court that the "lessees" are "in employ-
ment" within the meaning of the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Law will somehow bring about an adverse 
application of the Federal Social Security Act and the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and consequently some 
1200 . families in this State will be deprived of the op-
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portunity of being supported by labor 1n a gainful oc-
cupation. 
We fail to see how the coupling of the Utah Unem-
ployment Compensation Law with the Federal Wage 
and Hour legislation and the Federal Social Security 
Act has any rational basis whatsoever. Certainly, a con-
clusion by a State court that the employment relation-
ship exists within the meaning of the State unemploy-
ment compensation law can have no effect on the Com-
pany's status under the Federal ·wage and Hour legis-
lation. Particularly so since the coverage definitions of 
the two laws are entirely dissimilar. {See Section 19 (j) (5), 
Utah Unemployment Compensation Law, and 29 U.S. C. 
A. 203{d) {e) and, in particular, {g); Act of June 25, 1938, 
c. 676, para. 3, 52 Stat. 1060.) 
It is difficult to imagine any purpose served by 
the reference to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
and Col. Fleming's speech at Salt Lake City on October 
30, 1940. This Court should not be lead to the conclusion 
that the consequences of a decision adverse to the Com-
pany will be infinitely more far reaching and cause 
much more economic dislocation than might otherwise be 
expected. Contrary to the contention of the plaintiffs on 
page 8 of their brief, the "Acts" do not "dovetail" in 
"their operation and effect," and there is no legal basis 
for finding that "the rulings under one Act are persuasive 
as to the others." The very least that could be said with 
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of statutory construction is that even within the Federal-
State program for unemployment compensation the courts 
have refused to accord the coverage language in State 
unemployment compensation laws the interpretations of 
identical language in the Federal laws. Richlow Manu-
facturing Co. v. Brannaman, 104 P. (2d) 89'7 (1940); Capi-
tol Building and Loan Assn. v. Kansas Commissioner of 
Labor and Industry, 83 P. (2d) 106 (1938); Fidelity-Phila-
delphia Trust Co. v. Bashore, 48 Dauph. 59, 10 Atl. (2d) 
553 (1940); JVachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission of North Carolina, 12 
S. E. (2d) 592 (1939). 
II. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH. ACTED 
WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION AS ESTABLISHED 
BY THE LAW. 
Plaintiffs on page 23 of their brief state: 
" we would say that the representative 
order (Record p. 3) requiring Combined Metals 
Reduction Company to pay into the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Fund the necessary contrib-
utions on wages earned by Stevenson and Alver-
son, and their employees, is without validity." 
There seems to be some confusion as to what IS 
contained in the representative's order under date of 
October 3, 1940: therefore, we quote from that order: 
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"Based on facts and information presented to us, 
it is the determination of the Commission that 
this association of individuals does not constitute 
an 'employer,' but rather such individuals are 
performing services 'in employment' for the Com-
bined Metals Reduction Company within the 
meaning of Section 19(j) of the Utah Unemploy-
ment Compensation Law (Chapter 52, Laws of 
Utah, 1939). You are therefore required to file 
with this Department, additional Forms UC-3 
Rev., 'Contribution Report,' UC-106, 'Employer's 
Annual Report of Wages Payable,' and UC-106-A, 
'Employer's Annual Report of Wages Payable to 
Each Worker,' on which you report the earnings 
of these individuals for all periods in which they 
perform services for you. 
"You are also liable to pay1nent to the State Tax 
Commission of a contribution of 2.7 per cent based 
on the earnings of these individuals. You will 
be supplied with necessary forms on which to sub-
mit supplemental wage information. In the future, 
you will include the earnings of these individuals 
when filing with this Department your quarterly 
Form UC-3 Rev." 
We fail to find in this communication any words which 
can be construed as requiring the payment of any moneys 
into the Unemployment Compensation Fund. All that is 
required under this order is that the Combined Metals 
Reduction Company file the required forms with the De-
partment of Placement and Unemployment Insurance 
showing the earnings of Stev·enson and Alverson for all 
periods in which they performed serv~ces for the Com-
pany. Certainly there can be no question as to the author-
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ity of the Commission ";here it 1s delegated to so rule 
under Section 14(b) of the Law. 
The plaintiffs appealed from this order to the Appeal 
Tribunal, and the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the ruling 
of the representative. The plaintiffs then followed the pro-
cedure as outlined in Section 10 of the Law. 
In the light of these facts and the further fact that 
the Commission has not instituted any civil action for 
contributions against the plaintiffs, or any of them, it is 
difficult to perceive the relevance or materiality of the 
arguments as set out on pages 23 to 26 of plaintiffs' brief. 
In enacting the Utah Unemployment Compensation 
Law, the Legislature entrusted the administration of the 
Law to the Industrial Commission (Section 11); it im-
posed upon the Commission the duty to administer the 
Law; granted it full authority to issue rules and regula-
tions within the framework of the Law in order to accomp-
lish its purposes and further empowered the Commission 
"to require such reports" and "make such investigations" 
as it might deem necessary to carry out the provisions 
of the statute. (Section 11(a).) 
Section 14(b) of the Law empowers the Commission 
or its authorized representatives to determine the amount 
of contributions due from employers and to so notifv 
the employers. We quote: 
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" ... the commission or its authorized representa-
tive, may determine the amount of wages payable 
for employment occurring during the period or 
periods with respect to which the reports were 
or should have been made and the amount of con-
tribution due from such employer on the basis 
of such information as it may he able to obtain, 
and it shall give written notice of such determina~ 
tion to the employer . . ." 
Section 19(j) (5) of the Law requires the exclusion 
from "employment" to he determined by the "Commis· 
sion" which in turn is specifically defined by Section 
19(£) of the Law to mean the "Industrial Commission;" 
thus, by the terms of the statute, the Commission is under 
a duty to determine whether services were performed "in 
employment." 
The Law also provides definite appeal procedures 
and such procedures have been followed throughout in 
this case. 
The plaintiffs, on page 26 of their brief, ask three 
questions of this Court which call for wholly declaratory 
adjudiciation hearing no relation to the issues involved 
in this case. 
AS TO QUESTION NO. 1: 
"1. Are the District Courts of this State now 
without jurisdiction of a controversy between 
the Indus trial Comrp_ission and one claiming 
not to he an employer?" 
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(1) Since the statute provides exclusively for 
Supreme Court review of the decisions of the 
Commission, there would appear to be no 
necessity for the Court to declare whether or 
not the District Courts have jurisdiction over 
such a controversy as it presented in this 
case. 
AS TO QUESTION NO.2: 
"2. Is an order of the Industrial Commission re-
quiring payment of contributions unqualified-
ly invalid?" 
(2) It is irrelevent and immaterial inasmuch as 
there is no order of the Industrial Commis-
sion in this case requiring the payment of con-
tributions. 
AS TO QUESTION NO. 3: 
"3. That is to say, as we view it, does the Indus-
trial Commission have exclusive jurisdiction 
even of judicial questions, in the initial 
stages?" 
(3) This question may not be answered because it 
is apparent that the Commission does not 
make any such claim of exclusive jurisdic-
tion in this case as is contemplated by the 
question. 
III. 
THE LAW IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
Plaintiffs question the constitutionality of Chapter 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4b 
43, Laws of Utah, 1937, particularly with reference to 
Section 19 thereof, claiming that said purported amend-
atory act is in conflict with Sec. 23, Art. VI of the Con-
stitution of the State of Utah which is as follows: 
"Except general appropriation bills and bills for 
the codification and general revision of Laws, no 
bill shall be passed containing more than one sub-
ject which shall be clearly expressed in its title." 
The plaintiffs have fully answered their own ques-
tion by quoting the following passage from this Court's 
decision in the case of Globe Grain and Milling Company 
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra. 
"(6, 7) Petitioner contends that a holding as 
above makes the act unconstitutional as contraven-
ing fundamental law as contained in Article I, 
Section '7 (due process clause), Article I, Section 
18 (against impairing the obligations of contract), 
Article VI, Section 23 (prohibiting a bill from con-
taining more than one subject) of our State Con .. 
stitution and Article 1, Section X (impairing ob-
ligations of contract) and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution, U. S. C. A. ThiS. 
formidable array of assertions of constiutionality 
is not supported by the citation of any authorities. 
If the contention that the act did not clearly ex-
press in its title the subject is good, the act is 
unconstitutional regardless of whether we affirm 
or reverse the commission's findings. But the title 
does not offend in that regard. The subject in re-
gard to which the legislation pertains has been 
'clearly expressed in the title.' The subject is 'Un-
employment Compensation.' The constitutional 
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provision does not require that all the methods 
prescribed in the act for carrying out its objects 
be reflected in the title, nor all the classes affected 
by the act. There may be compensation for some 
types of unemployed independent contractors, as 
known in the common law concept, provided for 
in the act, which would be covered by the sub-
ject 'Unemployment Compensation.'" 91 P. (2d) 
516. (Italics ours.} 
See also Southern Photo and Blueprint Company v. Gore, 
114 S. W. (2d) ?96, and Gibson Products Company v. 
Jlurphy, 93 Okla. Appel. 240, 100 P. (2d) 453. 
Plaintiffs on pages 32 and 33 of their brief, argue 
that the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law incor-
porates an. unconstitutional classification or violates the 
due process of law requirement by providing that: 
j 
" . . liability for contributions would attach 
as against a large class not properly includable in 
the term 'employer' but whose liability would be 
created under the new definition, based upon con-
tractual relationships which hitherto had never 
been considered as constituting the relationship of 
employer and employee." 
It can no longer be questioned that a legislature has 
the power to enact a statutory plan to anticipate and 
alleviate the evils of unemploy~ent by providing un-
employment benefits for those who have worked for 
others·, and are presently willing to work, but cannot 
find work. Chamberlin v. Andrews, 2'71 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. 
(2d) 22, aff'd 299 U. S. 515; Gillum v. johnson, 92 Cal. 
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647, 62 P. (2d) 1037; Howes Bros. v. Unemploymen~ Com-
pensation Commission, (Mass. 1936), 5 N. E. (2d) 720 cert. 
denied 300 U.S. 658; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke 
Co., 301 U. S. 495; Bee land JiVholesale Co. v. Kaufman, 
(Ala. 1937), 174 So. 516; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 
301 U. S. 548; Southern Photo & Blueprint Co. v. Gore, 
supra; Tatum et al. v. Mississippi Unemployment Com-
pensation Commission, 180 Miss. 800, 178 So. 95. The pur-
pose and objectives of the unemployment compensation 
law being within the powers of the State, the classifica-
tions contained in the statute embodying the plan must, 
therefore, he tested by the same basic principles which 
underlie consideration of the plan when their validity is 
assailed. These tests of validity are applicable regardless 
of whether the contributions exacted under an unem-
ployment compensation system are viewed as a tax on 
a particular class, namely on those who engage the serv-
ices of others under circumstances where the continuance 
of the employment is dependent upon the will of the 
employer; or whether the classifications are regarded 
as being based on some relationship between those who 
are required to contribute and the evil sought to be 
remedied. Under either view, the question is simply one 
concerning the legislative discretion to select those sub-
jected to an exaction. With respect to the power of a 
legislature to select the classes to he taxed for the pur-
pose of creating an unemployment insurance fund, the 
New York Court of Appeals in Chamberlin v. Andrews, 
supra, said (p~ 14): 
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_ "Whether we consider such legislation as we have 
here a tax measure or an exercise of the police 
power seems to me to be immaterial. Power in the 
state must exist to meet such situations, and it 
can only be met by raising funds to tide over the 
unemployment period. Money must be obtained 
and it does not seem at all arbitrary to c·)nfine 
the tax to a business and employment out of which 
the difficulty principally arises. 
"It is said that this is taxation for the benefit of 
a special class, not the public at large, and thus 
the purpose is essentially private. The Legislature, 
after investigation, has found tile facts to be that 
those who are to receive benefits under the act 
are the ones most likely to be out of employment 
in times of depression. The courts cannot investi-
gate these facts and should not attempt to do so." 
' l 
In Beeland Wholesale Co. v; Kaufman, supra, the 
Alabama Supreme Court sustained the contributions as 
a tax and justified the payment of benefits as proper 
expenditures to promote· the safety, welfare, and health 
of the residents of the State. In Carmichael v. Southern 
Coal & Coke Co., supra, the Supreme Court of the United 
States sustained the contributions as a tax and the pay-
ment of benefits as expenditures designed to effect a 
public purpose. The Court said (pp. 508, 509): 
) 
"As the present levy has all the indicia of a tax, 
and is of a type traditional in the history of Anglo-
American legislation, it is within state taxing 
power, and it is immaterial whether it is called 
an excise or by another name. See Barwise v. 
Sheppard, 299 U. S. 33, 36. Its validity under the 
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Federal Constitution principles IS applicable to 
state taxation." 
Under such circumstances it would be within the 
power of the State to use funds derived from any source 
for the purpose of maintaining an unemployment insur-
ance plan, and the fact that the source may, in a par-
ticular statute, be identified with a particular group of 
taxpayers~ would not affect the validity of the plan. In re 
Hunter's Estate, 9'7 Colo. 2'79, 49 P. (2d) 1009; Police Pro-
tective Ass'n v. fVarren, 101 Colo. 586, '76 P. (2d) 94. In 
Welch v. Henry, 59 Sup. Ct. 121, the Court, in sustaining 
a State income tax imposed on a particular group be-
cause of the necessity for relief expenditures, said (p. 125): 
"Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the tax-
payer nor a liability which he assumed by con-
tract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost o£ 
Government among those who in some measure 
are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear 
its burdens." 
See also Clark v. Poor, 2'74 U. S. 554; Gillum v. johnson, 
supra; Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Tfl allace, 288 U. S. 249, 
268; Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U.S. 66; and Knights 
v. !ackson, 260 U. S. 12, -15;-all sustaining a tax on a 
group not necessarily related to the use to which the 
proceeds were devoted. "Expense for relief of the unem-
ployed is on no different footing than any other govern-
mental expense." Scobbie v. Tax Commission, 225 Wis. 
529, 538, 2'75 N. W. 531, 535. 
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The fact that the group taxed may be more or less 
related to the situation which necessitates an expenditure, 
however, may justify classification. Head Money Cases, 
112 U. S. 580 (tax on ship owners paid into fund for 
relief of immigrants); State v. Cassidy, (18?5) 22 Minn. 
312 (tax on saloon keepers to create a fund for relief of 
inebriates); Cooley v. Board of fV ardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 
299 (tax on pilotage to create a fund for relief of indigent 
pilots and their dependents); Dayton Goose Creek Ry. Co. 
v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 (payment of a part of the 
excess of railroad incomes to a fund to make loans to 
other railroads); McGlone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 2?4, 111 
S. W. 688, (tax on dog owners for payments for sheep 
killed by dogs): and Phoenix Assurance Co. of London v. 
Fire Department of City of Montgomery, 117 Ala. 631, 23 
So. 843 (tax on insurance companies for support of City 
Fire Department). See also Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 
219 U. S. 104. 
The classifications resulting from Section 19(j) (5) 
may therefore be justified either as a selection of a class 
for a particular exaction, or a choice based on a more 
or less intimate relationship between the class upon which 
the exaction falls and the problem of unemployment. 
Whichever basis is followed, the rule to be applied in 
testing the validity of a classification is whether there 
is any basis therefor, and this rule is equally applicable 
to the classification under the unemployment compensa-
tion law. It is settled law that a legislative classification, 
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when subject to judicial scrutiny will not be disturbed if 
any conceivable state of facts would support the selec-
tions made. Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 
supra; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 
219; Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., '72 
Colo. 268, 211 P. 649, aff'd 262 U. S. 710; Consumer's 
League of Colorado v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 53 Colo. 54, 
125, P. 577; In re Hunter's Estate, supra. The United States 
Supreme Court has often stated that, in the absence of 
any facts tending to show that a classification under 
a State act "in its purpose or: effect is a hostile or oppres-
sive discrimination," the legislative classification would 
not be disturbed. Welch v. Henry, supra. In Carmichael 
v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., supra, the Supreme Court 
said (p. 510): 
"This restriction upon the judicial function, in 
passing on the constitutionality of statutes, is not 
artificial or irrational. A state legislature, in the 
enactment of laws, has the widest possible latitude 
within the limits of the Constitution. In the nature 
of the case it cannot record a complete catalogue 
of the considerations which move its members to 
enact laws. In the absence of such a record courts 
cannot assume that its action is capricious, or 
that, with its informed acquaintance with local 
conditions to which the legislation is to be applied, 
it was not aware of facts which afford reasonable 
basis for its action. Only by faithful adherence 
to this guiding principle of judicial review of 
legislation is it possible to preserve to the legis-
lative branch its rightful independence and its 
ability to function." 
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The State legislature has the authority to extend the 
protection of unemployment compensation to individuals 
who are separated from the economic relationship which 
has afforded them a livelihood whether it be that of 
master and servant or a relationship that for purposes 
of ex delicto liability may be designated as principal not 
independent contractor. It may also protect those whose 
economic relationships might be otherwise designated; 
provided that the classification is reasonable and related 
to the evil sought to be eliminated. In other words, where 
for some purposes a landlord and tenant relationship is 
believed to exist if it appears that the personal services 
were performed under such circumstances as to fall 
within the definition of "employment" there certainly 
exists no legal basis for arguing that the Law is inapplic-
able or unconstitutional. 
Fundamentally the "lessees" and their employees 
bear the same economic relationship to the Company as 
any other employees whose coverage is unquestioned by 
the Company, and when separated from their "employ-
ment'' the loss to society, the evils, and social problems 
that arise are no different than those arising from the 
unemployment of the others. 
The test of coverage is not whether, for purposes ir-
relevant to an unemployment compensation law, the 
label "factor," "consignor," "independent contractor," 
"lessor," "landlord and tenant," etc., may be applicable 
to the situation, but rather whether the circumstances 
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under which the personal services were performed come 
within the statutory definition of "employment." 
We submit that the "lessees" and their employees 
are, in fact, in no different position economically than 
the other employees who are admittedly "in employ-
ment'' for the Company and that, therefore, this Court 
should find that the plaintiff "lessees" are "in employ-
ment" within the meaning of the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney General 
S. D. HUFFAKER, 
Deputy Attorney General 
A.M. FERRO, 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
F. F. DREMANN, 
Special Counsel 
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